Introduction
The appropriate characterization of the meaning of the preposition`for' has been a recalcitrant problem for theories of syntactic and semantic relations (Fillmore(1968) , Platt(1971) , Green(1974) , Allerton(1982) ). In this paper, I investigate the semantic interpretation of`for' prepositional phrases in English and examine the parallels that exist between`for' PPs and in nitival purpose clauses. I propose that both`for' PPs and in nitival purposives should be analyzed as adjuncts which introduce a higher-order relation of purpose which holds between the eventuality described by the clause the adjunct modi es and an potential eventuality introduced by the purposive adjunct itself. The critical di erence between in nitival purposives and`for' PPs is that in the former case the eventuality introduced by the adjunct is explicitly described by the adjunct clause, while in the latter case, the nature of the eventuality has to be encoded in the lexical semantics of for'. I will call these descriptions of eventualities parameterized-states-of-a airs (psoas). I develop an analysis of`for' PPs and in nitival purposive constructions in Head-driven phrase structure grammar (HPSG, Sag (1987,1994) ). This analysis e ectively captures the parallels in function and distribution between`for' PPs and purpose clauses. The analysis is further developed to account for NP-modifying`for' PPs and in nitival purpose clauses. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the di erent interpretations of`for' PPs that I am concerned with and elucidate the parallels that exist between`for' PPs and in nitival purposives. In Section 3, I present analyses of`for' PPs, in nitival purposives, and NP-modifying purposives. In Section 4, I summarize the results of the paper and discuss some remaining issues.
2`For' PPs as expressions of purpose
There are three di erent interpretations of a`for' PP which share the property that they specify the purpose of the psoa described by the clause they modify. I am rstly going to distinguish these di erent purposive senses of`for', and then go on to show how they are similar to in nitival purposives. Throughout this paper, I will refer to the clause which the adjunct modi es as the main clause. The eventuality described in the main clause will be referred to as the main clause psoa. If will refer to the clause in an in nitival purposive as the adjunct clause. The eventuality introduced by a`for' PP or an in nitival purposive will be referred to as the adjunct psoa.
The di erent purposive`for' PPs
A prepositional phrase headed by`for' can be used to specify the purpose of the main clause psoa 2 . There are three types of`for' PPs which I am going to argue express a purpose relation. The rst two of these were grouped together with the name`benefactives' in traditional grammar. The third set introduce an object which the agent of the main clause intends to acquire. I will return to these after discussion of the`benefactives'.
Benefactives
The intuition behind the term`benefactive' was that the phrases in question introduced a participant who bene ted in some way from the psoa described in the sentence. For example, consider (6).
(6) John baked a cake for Mary.
(6) has an easily available interpretation where John intends to please Mary by baking the cake 3 . I will refer to this as the benefactive interpretation of a`for' PP. While this is a possible interpretation of a`for' PP, it is not the only one. There is another interpretation which is recurrent and salient. The`for' PP`for Mary' in (6) can also mean that John intended Mary to receive the cake that he baked 4 . I am going to refer to this interpretation as the recipient interpretation of 2 There are several other uses of`for' PPs which I am not concerned with in this paper. For example,`for' can be used to identify one of the complements of a verb, as in (1)-(3).
(1) Sandy looked for Mary in the garden.
(2) The colonel asked the waiter for the bill. (3) Mrs. Chippam mistook the customer for an assistant.
I assume these verbs`look',`ask', and`mistake' subcategorize for`for' PPs and that`for' simply acts as a case marker which mediates the linking relation between an argument position in the semantics of the verb and a syntactic complement. I am not concerned here with the use of`for' to express duration as shown in (4).
(4) Dorothy lived in Kansas for ten years Neither am I concerned with the use of a`for' PP to express point of view, as in (5).
(5) For Mary, the weekend in Venice seemed most enchanting.
The contribution of the`for' PP here is that the proposition`the weekend in Venice seemed most enchanting' should be attributed to Mary. 3 This led Fillmore(1968:32) to use the label`benefactive' as the case assigned to`for' PPs, although in that paper he does not give an explicit account of their meaning. a`for' PP. These two interpretations are independent of each other. It is possible for a`for' PP to have the recipient interpretation and not the benefactive interpretation and vice-versa. In an example like (6), it is not a necessary part of the satisfaction conditions that the action of baking should please Mary. It may be that John knows that Mary hates cakes and he simply wants her to have a cake that he made. We can make the absence of an obligatory benefactive element of the satisfaction conditions more salient by loading the context. For example, consider (7) and (8).
(7) John bought the castor oil for the kids. (recip) (8) John prepared the poison for the king. (recip) In (7), John probably does not intend to please the kids with the castor oil, and on the interpretation of (8) where John intends the king to consume the poison, John most probably does not intend to please the king.
There is a variety of evidence that these benefactive and recipient interpretations of a`for' PP correspond to lexical ambiguity of`for'. First of all, such a distinction is plausible since in other languages, such as Spanish, di erent prepositions are used for these two senses. In Spanish,`por' is used for the benefactive interpretation, while`para' is used for the recipient interpretation. The hypothesis that the recipient and benefactive readings for a`for' PP correspond to di erent senses is further supported by the fact that the recipient interpretation and benefactive interpretation impose di ering constraints on the clause which they modify. The recipient interpretation is only available when main clause has an object. If the main clause is intransitive, there is no possibility of a recipient interpretation of a`for' PP, and only the benefactive interpretation is available. For example, both (9) and (10) only have a benefactive interpretation and do not have a recipient interpretation.
(9) John left early for Mary. (*recip) (10) John ate early for Mary. (*recip) The recipient interpretation not only requires that the verb have an object; the object has to be one which is created, transferred, or transformed in some way by the action described by the verb, as in examples (11), (12), and (13) respectively. Following Allerton (1982) , I will refer to this sort of object as an a ected object.
(11) Creation: Oliver baked a cake for Elizabeth. (recip) (12) Transfer: Oliver bought the candy for Elizabeth. (recip) (13) Transformation: Oliver cleaned some shoes for Elizabeth. (recip) The recipient interpretation of`for' is not available in the following examples because the object Chafe(1970:48) , Platt(1971:48) , Halliday(1971:147) . Green(1974:98) The recipient interpretation of (14) is impossible because the lm is not a ected by John's watching it. Also there is no recipient interpretation of (15) because Australia is not a ected by John's visit. The benefactive interpretation is readily available in these examples though. This restriction on the recipient interpretation provides evidence that the recipient and benefactive interpretations are in fact di erent senses of a`for' PP. Further distinctions between these two interpretations will be discussed in the next section when I discuss the parallels between`for' PPs and in nitival purposives. I am going to assume from now on that the recipient and benefactive interpretations correspond to two di erent senses of`for'.
While the recipient and benefactive senses of`for' impose di erent restrictions on the clause they modify, their contribution to the meaning of an utterance is very similar. They are both expressions of intention or purpose. In the case of the recipient sense,`for' introduces not necessarily the actual recipient, but rather the intended recipient. Under the recipient interpretation of`for Mary', (6) does not describe a psoa in which Mary necessarily receives`a cake'; that is, it is not part of the satisfaction conditions of the interpretation that the entity denoted by the complement of`for' receive the a ected object in the clause. However, (6) can describe a psoa in which John intends Mary to receive the cake that he bakes; that is, Mary is the intended recipient. The intentional nature of the recipient interpretation is highlighted by comparison with recipients in PPs headed by`to'. These are complements of certain verbs such as`give',`bring', and`take', as in (16).
(16) John gave/brought/took a book to Mary. (actual recipient) These verbs can also appear with a`for' PP with the recipient interpretation, as in (17).
(17) John gave/brought/took a book for Mary. (intended recipient) For (16) to be true Mary must receive the book, while for (17) to be true it is only necessary that John intends Mary to receive the book.
Similarly, benefactive`for' PPs express, not that the entity denoted by the complement of for' was in fact pleased by the action, but rather that main clause psoa was carried out with the intention that that entity be pleased as a result. For example, (18) does not entail that Mary was pleased by John's going early to work, but rather that John intended that his going to work early should please Mary. This similarity between the recipient and benefactive interpretations can be captured if we assume that they are both expressions of purpose and that they both introduce a higher-order relation of purpose between two psoas. They di er in the relation in the adjunct psoa but they share the same higher level relation of purpose. Before going into the analysis in more detail, I am going to introduce two further purposive interpretations of`for' PPs, the deputive and acquire interpretations, and show how`for' PPs parallel in nitival purposives.
The deputive interpretation
There is a further interpretation of a`for' PP in which the complement of`for' denotes a person on whose behalf the agent of the main clause performs the action described in the main clause. For example, consider (19) and (20). The`for ' PPs in (19) and (20) can be interpreted as introducing the person on whose behalf the agent of the main clause performs the action. Allerton(1982:104) refers to this interpretation as the deputive interpretation 5 . Like the recipient interpretation and the benefactive interpretation this interpretation contributes the purpose for the agent's action. In most examples where a deputive interpretation is possible, a benefactive interpretation is possible also. Furthermore, these two interpretations do not impose di erent restrictions on the main clause. It may be that there should be another sense of`for' which is responsible for the deputive interpretation, but in this paper I am going to assume that they are both instances of the benefactive sense of`for'.
The acquire sense of 'for'
There is a further purposive interpretation of a`for' PP under which the complement of`for' is an object which the agent of the main clause psoa intends to acquire. I will refer to this as the acquire interpretation. In (21) and (22), John killed in order to acquire`food' and`love' respectively. This must also be an independent sense of`for' since, unlike the recipient interpretation, there is no restriction to clauses which describe psoas with an a ected object. It cannot be grouped with the benefactive 5 Somers(1987:34-35 ) discusses the history of this interpretation of a`for' PP. It was one of the interpretations that Chafe(1970:151) and Platt(1971:30,50f) attributed to the`benefactive' case. interpretation since it never means that the complement of`for' is pleased or bene ts from the action described. The thing this sense of`for' shares with the benefactive and recipient interpretations is the intentional element of its meaning. It the expresses the fact that the agent of the main clause intends to acquire the object described by the complement of`for'. The acquire sense of`for' does not entail that the agent actually does acquire the object, only that they intended to as a result of their action. I propose that this sense of`for' should also introduce a parameterized state-of-a airs that expresses a purpose relation between the main clause psoa and an adjunct psoa. This would only di er from the other purposive senses of`for' in the nature of the adjunct psoa, which in this case would describe the agent of the main clause acquiring the object described by the complement of`for'.
Summary
In summary, I have identi ed three separate senses of a`for' PP which all function to describe the purpose of the parameterized state-of-a airs described by the clause they modify. These senses are responsible for the recipient, benefactive, and acquire interpretations. I proposed that all three senses introduce a psoa with the relation purpose which takes two psoas as its arguments. In each case, the rst psoa is the main clause psoa. The second psoa is the adjunct psoa and di ers from sense to sense. Further evidence for analyzing`for' PPs as purposive constructions comes from their comparison to in nitival purposes clauses, and in particular from the fact that there is a subclassi cation into object-oriented versus event-oriented purposives which cuts across both categories. These parallels are explored in the next two sections.
In nitival purposives
In nitival purposives are expressions such as`for the children to give to Mary' and`in order to give it to Mary' as in (23) Like the`for' PPs discussed in the last section, in nitival purposives introduce an eventuality that does not necessarily actually take place. In the examples above the eventuality of giving is not entailed to actually take place, rather it is stated as part of the intentions of the agent of the main clause. There are a number of striking parallels between`for' PPs and in nitival purposives. The rst I am going to address concerns the interpretation of inde nites in these constructions.
Parallels with respect to speci city
The intentional nature of both`for' PPs and in nitival purposives is re ected by the fact that if there is an inde nite NP as the complement of`for' or as an argument in the in nitival purposive, that NP can have a epistemically speci c or an epistemically non-speci c interpretation. As an example, consider (25) with a recipient interpretation of`for a talented actor'.
(25) The director designed it for a talented actor.
Under the speci c interpretation there is one particular talented actor that the director has in mind when he designs it, while under the non-speci c reading, the director does not have a particular actor in mind but intends that some individual who is a talented actor should receive it. The same ambiguity exists when an inde nite appears in an in nitival purposive, as in (26). (26) The director designed a part that had many lines for a talented actor to play. (27) An actor plays a part.
The inde nite`a talented actor' can have either a speci c or a non-speci c reading. On the speci c reading, the director designs the part with the intention that a certain actor should play it. On the non-speci c interpretation, the director designs that part with the intention that some talented actor should play it, but without a particular talented actor in mind. Non-speci c interpretations of inde nites are also possible in the main clause, but they are generally associated with generic interpretations, as in (27) . What is crucial here is that the inde nite can have a non-speci c interpretation when the sentence does not have a generic interpretation. If we assume that both`for' PPs and in nitival purposives introduce a purpose relation to the semantics, and that associated with this relation there is a modal operator which anchors the psoa introduced by the purposive to the intentions of the agent of the clause modi ed, this ambiguity could be analyzed as the result of whether the inde nite has wide or narrow scope with respect to this modal operator. It is implicit in my analysis that the psoa introduced by the purposive adjunct is modally subordinated. In this paper, I will not formalize the modal operator in such a way that this speci city e ect can be formalized.
The further parallels that I want to demonstrate all relate to distinctions between in nitival purposives that match up to related distinctions among`for' PPs. In the next section, I describe the di erent types of in nitival purpose clauses and how to distinguish them.
2.3 The di erent types of in nitival purposives Bach(1982) , Jones(1985 Jones( ,1991 , and Wallace(1986) discuss a sub classi cation of in nitival purposives into two classes. I will call these two classes true purpose clauses (PCs) and rationale clauses (RatCs).
(28) John gave the piano to Mary for her to practice on . (PC) (29) John gave the piano to Mary (in order) for her to practice on it. (RatC)
The italicized expressions in (28) and (29) both express the intentions of the agent John in giving the piano to Mary. The expression in (28) is a true purpose clause and the expression in (29) is a rationale clause. The immediately visible syntactic di erence between a PC and a RatC is that a RatC may be optionally preceded by the words`in order', as in (29), while PC may not, as in (30).
(30) * John gave the piano to Mary in order for her to practice on . (PC) A further di erence between PCs and RatCs is that PCs must have a gap in them which is interpreted as coreferential with an object in the clause they modify. The determination of the antecedent of this gap is generally assumed to be determined according to some theory of control be it con gurational, functional, semantic, or pragmatic. The gap may be in the subject position or in an object position. Jones(1985 Jones( ,1991 distinguishes the two types, naming them SPC and OPC respectively. The PC in (31) is an OPC while the example in (32) is a SPC. The SPC/OPC distinction is not crucial in this paper and will I just use the term PC as a cover term for both SPC and OPC from now on. RatCs may only have a gap in the subject position and not in an object position, as can be seen in (33).
(33) * John bought a book in order for Mary to read to the children. (RatC) (34) Lord James hired a boy in order to clean out the stables. (RatC) In (34) the antecedent of the subject gap is not the boy, as it was in (32) but in fact Lord James. The controller of a subject gap in a RatC must be the person who is responsible for the psoa which the RatC modi es. PCs may have both an object and a subject gap, in which case the object gap will be controlled by the shared object between the PC and the main clause. The subject gap is generally controlled by the person responsible for the main clause psoa 6 . Now that I have established these two basic criteria for distinguishing PCs and RatCs, I am going to discuss the other di erences between them and show how these di erences parallel the 6 It may also have a somewhat more free interpretation. For example:
(35) I brought along this wine to drink with dinner.
The subject of`drink' may be interpreted as the speaker, or as the group of diners. di erences between recipient`for' PPs and the other types of`for' PPs. I will address in turn, the restriction to main clause psoas with an a ected object, parallels involving pseudoclefts and VP-anaphora, constraints on the interpretation of sequences of purposives, future-orientation, and NP-modi cation possibilities.
The restriction to psoas with an a ected object
PCs and RatCs di er in that only RatCs are possible with intransitive verbs, as shown by (36) The crucial di erence between PCs and RatCs is that, while both express a psoa which is the purpose of the clause they modify, PCs require that there be some object in the main clause which is involved in the adjunct psoa. The psoa introduced by a RatC may involve an object from the main clause, but this is not necessary. This distinction between PCs and RatCs parallels the distinction between recipient`for' PPs and benefactive and acquire`for' PPs. Like PCs, recipient for' PPs require that there be an object in the main clause psoa, and they are not possible with intransitives. Like RatCs, the benefactive and acquire`for' PPs do not require that there be an object in the main clause psoa.
I discussed the fact above that recipient`for' PPs require that the main clause psoa involve an affected object. PCs appear to impose the same restriction on the clause they modify. Bach(1982:38) observes the following three sorts of contexts in which a PC is possible:
(I) Have/Be.
(38) John has an umbrella in the closet to use when it rains.
(39) The umbrella is kept in the closet for you to use when it rains.
(II) Transitive verbs which involve a continuance or change in the state of a airs of a positive sort.
(40) I bought the umbrella to use when it rains.
(41) I baked a cake to eat with dinner.
(III) Verbs of choice and use.
(42) I chose War and peace to read to the students.
A recipient`for' PP is possible in all of these cases as shown in (43) The majority of these examples are cases where the object is created, transferred, or transformed in some way. These are what, in keeping with Allerton(1982) , I have been calling`a ected objects'. It is not immediately clear that the objects of`have' and`be' are a ected objects from the semantics of these verbs, but both recipient`for' PPs and PCs are possible in these cases. It is the case, however, that the objects in these examples have been prepared in some way, even though it is not made explicit by the verb. For example, in (38),`John has an umbrella in the closet to use when it rains', the umbrella is an a ected object, not in the semantics of`have', but in the context. Part of the context is that John placed the umbrella in the closet and it is for this reason that the umbrella is an a ected object. In the analysis that follows, I will not attempt to account for this licensing from context and concentrate on examples where the object is an a ected object by virtue of being assigned an appropriate semantic role. The following examples serve to further emphasize this parallel between recipient`for' PPs and PCs. The objects of`read' and`watch' are not a ected objects. Since both PCs and recipient`for' PPs require an a ected object they should not be possible with 'read' or 'watch'. The impossibility of a PC with these verbs is supported by the ungrammaticality of (48) and (50). The impossibility of a recipient`for' PP is shown by the fact that (49) and (51) can only have a benefactive interpretation and cannot have a recipient interpretation.
A further parallel between recipient`for' PPs and PCs shows up in examples with pseudoclefts and VP-anaphora.
Pseudoclefts and VP-anaphora
I have established that both PCs and recipient`for' PPs require that there be an a ected object in the main clause psoa. The benefactive and acquire interpretations are like RatCs in that they do not impose this restriction on the main clause psoa. A recipient interpretation of a`for' PP is not possible when it does not directly follow the VP, as in pseudocleft constructions. In (52),`for Mary' is separated from the VP by the clefting and the recipient interpretation is not available. In (53),`for Mary' is clefted with the VP and the recipient interpretation is available. The benefactive interpretation of the`for' PP is possible in both of these examples. The behaviour of PCs is parallel in that they are only possible when they directly follow the VP, as shown by (54) and (55), while RatCs are possible in both positions, as shown by (56) VP-anaphora exposes a similar parallel between recipient`for' PPs and PCs. A recipient interpretation of a`for' PP is not possible when it modi es a pronoun`it' which is in an anaphoric relation with a VP with an a ected object, as in (58). The benefactive interpretation of`for' is perfectly acceptable in this example. These similarities between recipient`for' PPs and PCs, and benefactive`for' PPs and RatCs provide further support for the proposal that both`for' PPs and in nitival purposives are essentially the same kind of semantic entity. They are both expressions of purpose. The similarity between recipient`for' PPs and PCs can be captured by assuming they both constrain the main clause psoa to having an attribute which is an a ected object.
Interestingly, the PCs and the recipient interpretation of a`for' PP are possible in cases of null VP anaphora as shown by (61) The`it' anaphora in (58)- (60) is what Hankamer and Sag (1976) call deep anaphora, and the ellipsis in (61) and (62) is what they call surface anaphora. The recipient`for' PP and the PC are only possible in surface anaphora cases and not in deep anaphora cases. In the analysis proposed in Section 3, the requirement that there be an a ected object is local in that there has to be an attribute which is an a ected object in the psoa introduced by the expression to which the adjunct modi es, the main clause psoa. The restriction to surface anaphora cases will follow if in those cases the elided VP material is actually there in the semantic representation, because that would mean there would be a`buy' relation with an object which is an a ected object in the semantic representation of the second conjunct. In the deep anaphora cases, in the semantic representation of the second conjunct there is a semantic translation for`it' rather than a copy of the`buy' psoa from the rst conjunct. Since there is no a ected object in the semantic representation of what the adjunct modi es the PC and recipient`for' PP are not possible. This constraint also shows up in cases where there is more than one purposive modifying a clause, and it is to those cases that I now turn.
Constraints on sequences of purposives
For' PPs and in nitival purposives are also alike in that there can be more than one in a clause. They share the property that when there is more than one, the purposes must be interpreted recursively. What this means is that if there is more than one the second one speci es the purpose of the complex psoa introduced by the rst. I will consider`for' PPs rst of all. Gawron(1986 :376-378) observed that in an example with more than one`for' PP the second`for' PP modi es the complex situation created by the addition of the rst`for' PP. Example (63) describes a situation where Bob's making a sweater is to please Sue and that whole action of making it to please Sue is to please Mary. He assumes a unitary`benefactive' interpretation and does not consider the recipient sense of`for'. Given the assumption that each`for' PP in (63) can have more than one interpretation, we would expect there to a variety of di erent readings depending on which of the interpretations each`for' PP has. Consider the following example, in which there is no possibility of the rst`for' PP modifying the object of the verb directly, since the object is the pronoun`it'.
(64) Peter baked it for Mary for her kids. This can mean that Peter baked it, say a cake, with the intention that Mary receive the cake and that as a result of that her kids receive the cake. I assume that this is the result of both`for' PPs having the recipient interpretation. Example (64) can also mean that Peter baked it with the intention that Mary receive it and furthermore that Mary's receiving the cake would please her kids. I assume that this is the result of the rst`for' PP having the recipient interpretation and the second having the benefactive interpretation. This example can also mean that Peter baked it in order to please Mary and he intended that to please her kids. Interestingly the interpretation where the rst`for' PP is benefactive and the second is recipient is not available. This would mean that Peter baked it to please Mary and he had the intention that the kids receive it. This is another manifestation of the local nature of the restriction of recipient`for' PPs to modifying main clauses that describe psoas which have an a ected object. The rst`for' PP introduces a please relation. Given the assumption that purposives are interpreted recursively, the second`for' PP has to modify this pleasing relation. The please relation does not have an a ected object so the recipient interpretation is unavailable.
In nitival purposives behave in a parallel fashion. They are also necessarily interpreted recursively.
(65) John baked it to take to the party in order to give to John. (66) John left the room in order to please Mary in order to cheer up Sandy.
(65) has to mean that John baked it so that it could be taken to the party and as result of that it could be given to John. In (66) the purposives are RatCs. They cannot be interpreted as independent expressions of the purpose of John leaving the room. The purpose of John's leaving the room is to please Mary and furthermore by pleasing Mary he intends to cheer up Sandy. Given the parallels we have already seen between recipient`for' PPs and PCs, in particular the proposal that they both require an a ected object in the main clause psoa, we would expect a PC to be unable to follow a purposive that does not have an a ected object. Wallace(1986: 6-7) discusses the fact that when both a PC and a RatC occur in the same clause, the RatC must follow the PC, as shown by (67) Wallace adopts Faraci(1974) 's idea that this is because RatCs attach to a higher level of syntactic projection than a PC. If RatCs attach to S and PCs to VP, then RatCs will necessarily have to be outside PCs in linear order. This fact can be accounted for without reliance on this stipulative assumption that these adjuncts subcategorize for di erent syntactic categories. If the second in a sequence of purposives must modify the adjunct psoa introduced by the rst, then if we have a RatC which does not have an a ected object in its psoa, the only combination possible will be for the RatC to follow the PC. If the PC followed the RatC, the constraint that the main clause psoa for the PC have an a ected object would not be met. This explains the grammaticality of (67) in contrast to the ungrammaticality of (68). The ungrammaticality of (68) follows from the fact that there is no a ected object in the RatC`to please my mother'. In (67), on the other hand, the PC comes rst and its main clause psoa is the`buy' psoa which has an a ected object, the thing bought.
So then, we have the following parallel: just as in a sequence of two purposive`for' PPs the second can only have the recipient interpretation if the rst has an a ected object, in a sequence of in nitival expressions of purpose the second can only be a PC if the rst contains an a ected object.
The a ected object restriction is also relevant to combinations of`for' PPs with the recipient and acquire interpretations. The`for' PP in (69) can have the benefactive interpretation but not the recipient interpretation. This is accounted for by the fact that there is not an a ected object in the work psoa. However, in (70), when the rst`for' PP has the acquire interpretation, the second`for' PP can have the recipient interpretation.
(70) John worked for food for his family. (acquire,recip) This provides direct evidence that the second`for' PP must modify the purpose introduced by the rst`for' PP. The rst`for' PP introduces an acquire relation which has an object which is transferred, the thing acquired. This is an a ected object so the condition required for the recipient interpretation is met. If the second`for' PP was directly modifying the`work' psoa, it would not be able to have a recipient interpretation because the psoa described by`work' does not have an a ected object. As we would expect the order of the two`for' PPs cannot be reversed, as in (71).
(71) * John killed for his family for food. (* recip,acquire) Since the purpose introduced by the rst`for' PP will be modi ed by the second`for' PP, thè for' PP with an a ected object must come rst in linear order.
Future orientation
Another criterion which groups PCs with the recipient interpretation of`for' PPs is that they are both future-oriented; that is, the time to which the adjunct psoa introduced by a PC or a recipient for' PP is anchored is necessarily later than the time when the main clause psoa takes place. Bach(1982) points out that RatCs need not be future-oriented with respect to the time of the main clause psoa, as in the example in (72).
(72) I bought it in order to use up my money.
His point is that the main action, buying it, and the desired consequence, using up all the money, are cotemporaneous. By virtue of the fact that these modi ers specify a purpose there is no way for the adjunct psoa in the RatC to be in the past with respect to the main clause psoa. They are best characterized as non-past; that is, they may be cotemporaneous or future-oriented with respect to the time of the main clause psoa. PCs on the other hand must be future-oriented with respect to the time of the main clause psoa. This makes sense if we assume that what PCs do is express the relation between an act of preparation of some sort, the main clause psoa, and the desired use of an object, the adjunct psoa. This explains the oddity of (73).
(73) * John baked the cake to brown. (PC) Even though the cake is an a ected object the PC is cotemporaneous with the main clausè baking' psoa and thus not felicitous. In (74) on the other hand, the PC adjunct psoa is futureoriented with respect to the main clause psoa and thus the PC is ne.
(74) John baked the cake to eat with dinner. (PC) If you want to express the fact that John baked the cake so that in the process of baking the cake would become brown a RatC has to be used and thus the gap must be lled by a pronoun, as in (75).
(75) John baked the cake in order to brown it. (RatC)
The same distinction in temporal orientation extends to the distinction between recipient`for' PPs and benefactive`for' PPs.
(76) John baked a cake for Mary.
Under the interpretation where Mary receives the cake, it is necessarily after the baking that Mary receives the cake. On the reading where John intends to please Mary by baking the cake, Mary being pleased and John baking the cake can be cotemporaneous.
NP-modi cation
A further parallel between`for' PPs and in nitival purposives is that they can both modify NPs. Furthermore, recipient`for' PPs and PCs group together in that they can modify object denoting NPs, while the other`for' PPs and RatCs group together in that they can only modify event denoting NPs. The purposive adjunct in these cases speci es that the object denoted by the NP was intended to be used for the purpose speci ed by the purposive adjunct. In (77), the adjunct for Mary' indicates that Mary was the intended recipient of the book. In (78), the adjunct`for John to give to Mary' indicates that someone intended John to give the book to Mary. Benefactive`for' PPs and RatCs and can only modify NPs which denote events. In (79), the adjunct`for Mary' indicates that the party was intended to please Mary. In (80), the adjunct`for freedom' indicates that the thing the participants in the battle intended to acquire was freedom. In (81), the adjunct`to nd a cure' indicates that the purpose of the search was to nd a cure. Unlike PCs and recipient`for' PPs, other types of`for' PPs and RatCs are not felicitous as modi ers of object denoting NPs. In (82), the adjunct`for Mary' can only have a recipient interpretation, it cannot have a benefactive interpretation, and the ungrammaticality of (83) shows that RatCs cannot modify object-denoting NPs. The interpretation of these NP-modifying purposives is addressed in Section 3.6.
Summary
In this section, I have shown that certain interpretations of`for' PPs are like in nitival purpose clauses in that they specify the purpose for which the state or event described by the main clause psoa was brought about. They share with purpose clauses the fact that an inde nite NP in thè for' phrase can have either a speci c or a non-speci c reading, even when the interpretation of the clause is non-generic. Furthermore, I have shown that there are variety of di erent factors that distinguish recipient`for' PPs and PCs, which I group together as object-oriented purposives, from benefactive`for' PPs, acquire`for' PPs, and rationale clauses, which I group together as event-oriented purposives. The essential di erence is that recipient`for' PPs and PCs both require there to be an a ected object in psoa described by the clause they modify. Recipient`for' PPs and PCs are also alike in that they are future-oriented, and they can modify object denoting NPs. The other`for' PPs and RatCs can introduce psoas which are cotemporaneous with the main clause psoa and they can modify event, but not object, denoting NPs. The parallels between these di erent subtypes of purposive constructions are summarized in the chart in (84). (84) Object-oriented Event-oriented PC RatC recipient`for' PP benefactive`for' PP acquire`for' PP Require an a ected object Don't require an a ected object Cannot be stranded in pseudoclefts Can be stranded in pseudoclefts Cannot modify deep anaphora VP Can modify deep anaphora VP Future orientation Non-past orientation Modify object denoting NPs Modify event denoting NPs
In following section, I present an analysis of purposive adjuncts which captures the parallels between purposive`for' PPs and in nitival purposives and accounts for the di erent properties of these constructions addressed in this section.
An analysis of`for' PPs in HPSG
The theory of Head-driven phrase structure grammar (HPSG) is particularly well suited to the analysis of phenomena such as purposive adjuncts because it facilitates representation of the interaction between syntactic and semantic information in these constructions. I adopt the version of the theory which is described in Pollard and Sag 1994. In the rst two subsections below, I introduce the purpose relation between psoas which I propose is common to the semantic representation of both`for' PPs and in nitival purposives and discuss the sorting of psoa attributes which I use to encode the restriction of object-oriented purposives to main clause psoas with an a ected object. I then discuss the syntax of adjuncts in HPSG and present the analyses of purposive`for' PPs, in nitival purposives, and NP-modifying purposives in turn.
The semantics of purposives
I assume that the semantic representation of a purposive adjunct involves a psoa whose relation is purpose. This relation of purpose has two attributes which are both of the sort psoa: MAIN and PURPOSE. The value of MAIN is the psoa described by the clause the purposive adjunct modi es. The value of PURPOSE is the psoa described by the purposive adjunct. The attribute-value matrix (AVM) for this relation is as in (85). I assume that this relation is common to all of the purposive adjuncts, both`for' PPs and in nitival purposives. The semantics of the purpose relation are that the person responsible for bringing about the MAIN psoa intends that as a result the PURPOSE psoa should come about. The necessity of the relation RESP which indicates the individual responsible for a situation is argued for by Farkas (1988) . This relation will not be explicitly formalized in my analysis, but it is an implicit part of the interpretation of my proposed purpose relation. Reference to the notion of responsibility enables an account of examples with purpose clauses and no overt agent such as (86).
(86) The gun is in the drawer for you to use in an emergency.
3.2 The sorting of attribute labels I follow Gawron and Peters 1990 in deriving the names for the attributes of a relation from the name of the relation itself. For example, the attributes of the`bake' relation will be BAKER and BAKED. In order to identify the presence of an a ected object in a psoa I am going to assume that there is a second-order sorting of these attribute labels. This embodies the idea from thematic role theory that there are groups of shared properties held by the participants in di erent relations which are theoretically signi cant. The di erence from the standard conception is that the attributes of a particular relation can be as speci c as necessary. The shared properties are the result of the formulation of a sort hierarchy of participant attribute labels. For example there will be a sort agent, of which the attributes ACQUIRER, KILLER, BAKER, and all other attributes corresponding to agentive participants in relations will be subsorts. Another sort is a -obj. BAKED, BOUGHT, ACQUIRED, and all the other attributes corresponding to a ected objects will be subsorts of this sort. An a ected object is one which is created, transferred, or transformed in some way by the action described in the psoa in which it appears. In the following analysis, the restriction on object-oriented purposives will be encoded as the requirement that there be an attribute of the sort a -obj in the main clause psoa.
The syntax of adjuncts in HPSG
I assume, in keeping with the version of the theory given in Pollard and Sag(1994) , that adjuncts, such as purposive adjuncts, select for their heads rather than vice-versa. The combination of an adjunct and a head is mediated by a subsort of con-struc, namely head-adj-struc. The schema is de ned as in (87). (87) HEAD-ADJUNCT SCHEMA A head adjunct structure is a DTRS value with two attributes: HEAD-DTR and ADJ-DTR. This structure is constrained in that the MOD value of the ADJ-DTR is token-identical to the SYNSEM value of the HEAD-DTR.
The MOD value of an adjunct is an attribute of the value of HEAD. The head-adjunct schema can be given in AVM form as in (88). (88) The index l] indicates the required token identity between the MOD value of the adjunct and the SYNSEM value of the head. The combinatory properties of an adjunct are speci ed within its MOD attribute. These combinatory properties constraint the type of head that the adjunct can combine with. The semantics principle, as in (89), ensures that the semantics of the head-adjunct combination are those of the adjunct daughter. I am not going to consider quanti er retrieval in this paper so I will use the second version of the Semantics principle given in Pollard and Sag(1994) .
(89) Semantics Principle In a headed phrase, the CONTENT value is token-identical to that of the adjunct daughter if the DTRS value is of sort head-adj-struc, and with that of the head daughter otherwise.
The analysis of`for' PPs
The interesting fact about`for' PP purposives is that they appear to perform very much the same function as in nitival purposives. In order to capture this fact I have proposed that both`for' PPs and in nitival purposives introduce purpose relation which takes two psoa-valued arguments. In the case of in nitival purposives, it is clear where these two psoas come from. The MAIN psoa is that described by the main clause, the clause the adjunct modi es. The PURPOSE psoa is that described by the clause in the in nitival purposive. In the case of`for' PPs, it is not immediately clear how the appropriate PURPOSE psoa is identi ed since all`for' has as a complement is an NP. I propose that both the PURPOSE psoa and the purpose relation are part of the lexical semantics of the preposition`for'.
The recipient interpretation of a`for' PP comes from the recipient lexical entry for`for', as in (90). (90 The index i] which appears after the RECEIVER attribute and on the NP that`for' subcategorizes for indicates that the RECEIVER inherits the semantics of the complement of`for'. This represents that fact that the entity denoted by the complement of`for' is the recipient. The function of the index j] is to ensure that the semantics of the RECEIVED will be indexed with the semantics of the a ected object in the main clause psoa. The a -obj speci cation must unify with some attribute in the main clause psoa. I assume that if a sorted attribute like this does not get uni ed with some attribute the representation is ill-formed. The importance of the (PURPOSEj) notation will be explained later when I discuss examples with more than one`for' PP. The function of the index k] is to ensure that the MAIN attribute of the purpose relation inherits the semantics of the main clause psoa. The MAIN psoa is the psoa described by the main clause, the clause being modi ed.
The CONT of an NP is usually a PARAMETER attribute which contains an index and a RESTRICTION attribute which contains a list of restrictions on the index. For ease of exposition here I will make the assumption that NPs have a simpler semantics. I am going to assume that the CONT of`Mary' is mary' and the CONT of`a cake' is a cake'. The signs for`Mary' and`a cake' will be as in (91) and (92). I will use the more complex NP-semantics later in the discussion of NP modi cation. The sign of the`for' PP`for Mary' is like (90) except that the SUBCAT list is empty and the semantics of the NP`Mary' are uni ed with the value of the RECEIVER attribute. The resulting sign is as in (93). (93) The sign for the recipient interpretation of`for Mary' 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 PHON < for Mary > SY NSEMjLOC 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 CAT I assume that the semantics of the benefactive sense of`for' are the same except that the psoa which is the value of the PURPOSE attribute contains a please relation with one attribute: the PLEASED. There is no requirement that there be an a ected object in the semantics of the main clause psoa. This type of`for' PP interpretation results from the lexical entry for`for' in (94). Once again the index k] indicates that the main clause psoa is inherited by the MAIN attribute in the purpose psoa. The index i] indicates that the semantic contribution of the complement of`for' is inherited by the PLEASED attribute. The acquire sense of`for' will be the same but the value of the PURPOSE attribute has an acquire relation with the attributes ACQUIRER and ACQUIRED, as in (95). (95) The acquire sense of`for': 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 PHON < for > SY NSEMjLOC 
There is a possible head-adj-struc which has the sign for`John bakes a cake' as its head daughter and the sign for the recipient interpretation of`for Mary' as its adjunct daughter, as in (97). (97) 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 PHON < John bakes a cake for Mary > SY NSEMjLOC 
DTRS 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 HEAD ? DTR ADJ ? DTR : 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 the RECEIVED attribute in the PURPOSE psoa. As a result, the a ected object, the BAKED object, which is the cake, is coindexed with the RECEIVED value of the PURPOSE psoa. As a result of the semantics principle, the CONT value of the resulting structure is the CONT value of the adjunct. The semantic representation of the main clause psoa is inherited as the value of the MAIN attribute in the purpose psoa through the index k]. I assume that the composition of the benefactive and acquire`for' PPs with a clause proceeds in much the same way. I turn now to consider cases where there is more than one`for' PP.
3.4.1 Sequences of`for' PPs I assume that in an example such as (98), the`for' PP`for Mary' is in a head-adj-struc like that described above and then that structure in turn is the head daughter of a further head-adj-struc in which`for her kids' is the adjunct.
(98) John baked a cake for Mary for her kids.
In order to allow this structure to be modi ed by a further adjunct I have included the (PURPOSEj) speci cation in the entries for the di erent interpretations of`for' above. This is intended to mean that the a -obj or agent speci cation can either be directly available in the psoa, or it can be within a psoa which is the value of PURPOSE. The () indicate optionality. The notation (PURPOSEj)a -obj represents a disjunction between a -obj and PURPOSEja -obj. When the second`for' PP has a recipient interpretation, the indexing in the head-adj-struc will lead to the indexing of the semantics of`John baked a cake for Mary' with the MAIN attribute of the purpose relation associated with the second adjunct. The RECEIVED attribute in the value of PURPOSE in the topmost psoa will be uni ed with the RECEIVED attribute in the lower PURPOSE psoa and that in turn is uni ed with the semantics of`a cake'. The a -obj requirement of the second adjunct is met as long as we assume that RECEIVED is a subsort of a -obj. The resulting CONT value for (98) will be as in (99). interpretation. This follows from the analysis here, since given the way things are set up, the second`for' PP has to modify the psoa corresponding to the combination of the main clause and rst adjunct. If that rst adjunct has a benefactive interpretation, the resulting psoa will have a purpose attribute whose relation is the please relation. If the second`for' PP has a recipient interpretation it will require that the psoa which is the value of PURPOSE have an attribute of the sort a -obj. There is not an attribute of the sort a -obj in the please relation and thus the recipient interpretation will not be available for the second`for' PP.
The fact that a recipient`for' PP can follow an acquire`for' PP follows from the analysis given here. The recipient`for' PP modi es the acquire psoa and the ACQUIRED is an attribute of the sort a -obj. The semantic representation for an example like (101) would be as in (102). (101) John worked for food for his family.
(102) 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 I assume that the verb`do' introduces a psoa whose relation is do and which has the attributes DOER and DEED. The expressions in square brackets in the examples above will have the semantic representations in (107) In each case, the index x] is meant to indicate that the value of the DEED attribute is structure shared with the semantics of the VPs`buy candy' and`bought cookies' respectively. The semantics of these VPs does in fact contain an attribute of the sort a -obj but, crucially, the recipient interpretation of`for' requires that there be an attribute of the sort a -obj in the psoa denoted by the expression it directly modi es. In both (103) and (105) the`for' PP modi es a`do' psoa which does not have an attribute of the sort a -obj and therefore the recipient interpretation is impossible.
Summary
In this section I have introduced the syntactic and semantic representations which are assigned to the purposive intrepretations of a`for' PP. I have shown how the restriction of the recipient interpretation to modifying clauses with an a ected object can be captured by assuming that the main clause psoa must have an attribute of the sort a -obj. The analysis accounts for the recursive interpretation of clause modifying`for' PPs by allowing a purpose psoa to be the MAIN psoa of another purpose psoa. This aspect of the analysis interacts with the restriction on the recipient interpretation that there has to be an a ected object to explain the restrictions on the interpretations of a sequence of`for' PPs and the pseudocleft and deep VP-anaphora facts. I return now to in nitival purposives and show how have the same basic analysis as purposive`for' PPs.
The analysis of in nitival purposives
My goal in this section is to show how the external syntax and semantics of PCs and RatCs is like that of purposive`for' PPs. I am only going to concern myself with the the function of PCs and RatCs as units which modify clauses, and I will not attempt to capture the internal syntax of PCs and RatCs. To do so would involve a fully-edged analysis of control and gapping and is beyond the scope of this paper 7 . I will make some comments regarding the nature of the internal syntax in the commentary following the analysis.
I propose that, just like a`for' PP, the content of a PC or RatC speci es the intentions of the person responsible for the psoa that is modi ed. This is captured by assuming that in nitival purposives are clausal adjuncts whose semantic contribution is a psoa whose relation is purpose, and which takes two attributes whose values are of the sort psoa: MAIN and PURPOSE. The value of PURPOSE is the psoa described by the purpose clause, and the value of MAIN is the main clause psoa.
The di erence between a RatC and a PC is that, like the recipient`for' PP, the PC requires that there be an attribute in the main clause psoa which is of the sort a -obj. This will be speci ed in the MOD value just as in the sign for the recipient`for' PP. The PC`for Sue to give to Peter' will have the sign in (109).
(109) 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 I am assuming that the external syntax and semantics of a RatC di ers only in that there is no requirement that there be an a ected object in the main clause psoa. The RatC`in order to please Mary' will have the sign given in (111).
(111) 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
The index i] ensures that the agent of the MAIN psoa is the agent of the psoa which is the value of PURPOSE. This is an oversimpli cation since it is not always the agent of the main clause that controls the subject gap but there is not space to investigate this issue further in this paper.
This analysis captures the various other facts that are shared between`for' PPs and in nitival expressions of purpose. The impossibility of PCs modifying a`do' psoa in pseudoclefts and deep VPanaphora are the result of the a -obj constraint requirement on the MAIN psoa. The restrictions on possible sequences of PCs and RatCs follow from the same constraint. The analysis also accounts for the fact that if there is a sequence of a`for' PP and a PC modifying a clause the`for' PP has to have the recipient interpretation. In (113),`for linguists for them to sort data with' is such as sequence.
(113) The administrators bought it for linguists for them to sort data with.
PC is object-oriented. RatCs, on the other hand, simply express a relation between an event and an intended result. The existence of a shared object is simply coincidental in those cases.
The second issue concerns how the signs given above for a PC and a RatC are composed. In a`for' PP the preposition`for' is always present so we can assume that it is the source of the purposive meaning. However, in PC and RatC, the`for' only appears if there is an overt subject in the PC or RatC, as shown in (115) to (118).
(115) John brought it for Mary to give to Peter. (PC with`for') (116) John brought it to give to Peter (PC without`for') (117) John brought it for Mary to practice on it (PC with`for') (118) John brought it to practice on it. (RatC without`for') One possibility would be to assume that if`for' is absent there is an empty operator which contributes the purposive meaning. This solution does not t well within the HPSG framework. An alternative that the framework allows would be to assume that there is a phrase structure schema especially for the expression of purpose. The fact that the psoa described in the PC or RatC becomes the value of PURPOSE in the main clause psoa could be stated as a restriction on the schema. The account could be extended to cover the`for' PPs as well. Further development of this idea remains as a direction for further work. These modi ers specify the purpose to which the object denoted by the NP which they modify is to be put. In (119), the expression`for Mary' contributes the fact that Mary is the intended recipient of the book. In (120), the expression`for Mary to meet' contributes the fact that`the man' is someone that Mary is intended to meet. This section examines the properties of these constructions in more detail. I will rstly show how the NP-modifying object-oriented adjuncts can be distinguished from their clause-modifying counterparts. I will then extend the formal analysis to account for the semantics of object-oriented NP-modi ers. I then turn to the event-oriented purposives an develop an account of their function as NP-modi ers of event-denoting NPs.
Distinguishing NP-modi ers from VP-modi ers
It is very important for us to be able to distinguish purposive NP-modi ers from purposive clausal modi ers because examples where the modi ed NP is in object position can be ambiguous. For example, (121) has two possible readings which are described in (A) and (B).
(121) John bought the cake for Mary.
(A) John bought the cake with the intention that as a result Mary would receive the cake. (This is the clause modi er reading).
(B) Mary's receiving the cake is not related to John's buying the cake. He does not intend Mary to receive the cake in fact he may not even know that Mary is meant to receive the cake (This is NP-modi er reading).
There is a similar ambiguity in (122).
(122) John bought the cake to give to Mary. (PC) One way to disambiguate this sort of example is to add the adverb`accidentally' to the clause. In (123), the adverb`accidentally' contributes the fact that John's buying of that particular cake was not intentional and thus the occurrence of a purposive clause modi er is not licensed. Thus in (123), the (B) reading, which corresponds to NP attachment of the adjunct, is the only one available.
(123) John accidentally bought the cake for Mary] and gave it to Joan. Similarly, the ambiguity of (122) is not present in (124).
(124) John accidentally bought the cake to give to Mary] and gave it to Joan.
It is also possible to isolate the di erent meanings by altering the syntactic context. The clause modi er reading can be isolated by making the NP one which does not take modi ers, such as a pronoun or a proper name as in (125)and (126), preceding it with a nite relative clause, as in (127), or ensuring that there is another complement intervening, as in (128) The NP-modi er reading can be isolated by getting the NP into subject position. This is the case in passives like (133) and (134) and with the verbs`have' and`be', as in examples (135) A another syntactic di erence is that the complement of`for' can only be questioned when thè for' PP is a clause modi er. This is because it is not possible to extract out of NP to form a question.
(139) Who did John bake a cake for ?
Now having shown how NP-modifying purposives can be distinguished from their clause-modifying counterparts both syntactically and semantically, I am going to show how they analysis I have proposed can be extended to account for NP-modifying purposives.
3.6.2 The analysis of object-oriented purposive NP-modi ers I will give an analysis here of NP-modifying recipient`for' PPs. The same analysis can be extended to account for true purpose clauses (PCs). I will only present the analysis of 'for' PPs here though. The semantic contribution of a recipient`for' PP in an example like (140) is that the object denoted by the NP it modi es was intended to be received by Mary. The individual who intended Mary to receive the cake is not speci ed. This sort of example shows that there is no necessary relation between the main clause psoa of the clause in which the NP appears and the intention that Mary receive the cake.
This analysis is going to make use of the full version of NP semantics in HPSG rather than the abbreviated version that I have been assuming so far. Up until now I have assumed for ease of presentation that NPs contribute atomic semantics like a cake' and john'. Pollard and Sag(1994) propose that the CONT value of an NP consists of two attributes: PARAMETER (PARA) and RESTRICTION (RESTR). The PARAMETER value of structure of sort parameter can be thought of as the HPSG analog of a reference marker in DRT (cf. Kamp(1981) ). It contains an index and person, number, and gender information. I will suppress the latter here and only give the index. The RESTR attribute contains a set of psoas. This set places conditions on the entities that the parameters appearing in them can be anchored to. I am not going to consider the semantics of determiners here for ease of exposition. The sign for`the cake' will be as in (141). thought of as a set of AVMs which represent the properties of all the individuals in the discourse and all the things that have taken place. The process of identifying that a particular entity was for Mary' involves searching through the model looking for a psoa which uni es with the second psoa in the RESTR above in (142).
I am going to assume that the method of combination of a`for' PP NP-modi er and the NP it modi es is exactly the same as the combination a clause-modifying`for' PP with a clause. The two both t into a head-adj-struc. I propose that this NP-modifying recipient sense of`for' has the sign in (143) as its lexical entry.
(144) John bought it for Mary for her kids.
(145) John ! Mary ! her kids This is accounted for by my analysis, since the second`for' PP has to modify the purpose psoa contributed by the rst. The interesting di erence with NP-modi ers is that this ordering is not required. For example, in the interpretation of (146), the intended order of possession of the cake is not xed. The cake may be to be given to Mary so that she then gives it to her kids, or the cake may be an object intended for Mary which is given rst to her kids so that they give it to her. These two readings can be diagrammed as in (147) The availability of this range of interpretations is expected under my analysis. Each psoa will be added to the RESTR in turn. It is not necessary that the second`for' PP modify the rst because they are added into a set of unordered conditions on a referring index.
I now want to consider the analysis of examples where acquire and benefactive and`for' PPs and RatCs function as NP-modi ers of event-denoting NPs.
3.6.3 Event-oriented NP-modi ers I have characterized acquire 'for' PPs, benefactive 'for' PPs, and RatCs as event-oriented NPmodi ers. They share the property that unlike recipient`for' PPs and PCs they cannot modify NPs which denote entities 8 . This is most clearly seen in examples with RatCs, as in (151) There are some cases in which these senses of`for' PPs appear to be modifying an entity denoting NP:
(149) The sticky strip for foolish insects was a very popular feature of our product (acquire). (150) The blue icing for Mary was put on by John (benefactive).
It may be that these can be assimilated to the recipient interpretation. This remains as a direction for further work.
Summary
In this section, I have shown how the analysis of clause-modifying purposive adjuncts which I have proposed can be extended to account for the properties of NP-modifying purposive adjuncts. They involve the same purpose relation and they can appear together in accordance with the phrase structure schema head-adj-struc. The di erence is that the purpose psoa introduced by the adjunct becomes one of the restrictions on the index associated with the parameter introduced by the NP. This analysis accounts for the fact that clause modifying adjuncts are necessarily interpreted recursively in accordance with their order of appearance while NP-modifying adjuncts do not have to be interpreted recursively. Event-oriented purposives can also modify NPs, so long as their semantic representation is a psoa with an agent.
Conclusions
I have proposed that there are three di erent senses of a`for' PP: the recipient, benefactive, and acquire senses. These introduce psoas in which the relations are receive, please, and acquire respectively. I have shown that this subset of the uses of a`for' PP are best analyzed as purposive adjuncts.`For' PPs share with in nitival purposives the function of specifying the intentions of the agent who brought about the main clause psoa, the clause they modify. I have identi ed two subgroups of purposive adjuncts: object-oriented purposives and event-oriented purposives. The object-oriented purposives are the recipient`for' PPs and true purpose clauses (PCs). They share the property that they require the psoa they modify to have an attribute of the sort a -obj. They also share the property of being future-oriented and can both modify object denoting NPs. The event-oriented purposives are the benefactive and acquire senses of a`for' PP and rationale clauses (RatCs). They share the property of not requiring that there is an a ected object in the psoa described by the clause they modify. They are non-past as opposed to future-oriented and they modify NPs which denote psoas, but not object denoting NPs.
An analysis has been formulated in Head-driven phrase structure grammar. Both NP and clause modifying adjuncts are captured within the head-adj-struc phrase structure schema proposed in Pollard and Sag 1994 . The similarity of meaning between purposive`for' PPs and in nitival purposives is captured by assuming that they all introduce a purpose relation which has two psoavalued attributes. The rst of these is labeled MAIN and is structure shared with the CONT of the clause modi ed. If the adjunct is a PC or a recipient`for' PP there must be an attribute of the sort a -obj in the MAIN psoa. This restriction accounts for the fact that object-oriented purposives cannot appear in pseudocleft constructions or modifying`do it' in examples with deep VP-anaphora. The PURPOSE psoa is, in the case of the in nitival purposives, the psoa described by the clause in the in nitival purposive. In the case of the 'for' PPs, the PURPOSE psoa comes from the lexical semantics of`for'. The analysis accounts for the fact that when there is more than one purposive adjunct they are necessarily interpreted recursively. The second purposive adjunct has to modify the PURPOSE psoa introduced by the rst purposive adjunct and so on. Along with the restriction of object-oriented purposives to psoas with an a ected object, this accounts for the restrictions on the interpretations of sequences of purposive adjuncts. The fact that NP-modifying purposives do not have to be interpreted recursively follows from the assumption that each NPmodifying purposive contributes a separate restriction to the parameter index of the NP that it modi es. The conception of syntax and semantics in Head-driven phrase structure grammar is particularly well suited to this sort of analysis. Two properties that were critical in this analysis are the parallel representation of syntactic and semantic information and the structured nature of the semantic representation.
I now want to consider some possible directions for further work. The rst of these is the explanation of multiple interpretations of a`for' PP.
Pragmatic rules for multiple interpretations
I believe that the proper analysis of the semantics of`for' PPs has been muddied by the operation of certain pragmatic rules. An example like (156) can have an interpretation of the`for' PP in which Mary is not only the intended recipient of the cake but also John intends to please Mary.
(156) John baked a cake for Mary.
The appearance of this apparent multiple interpretation of a`for' PP can be reconciled with the analysis I have proposed here if there is the general rule of pragmatic interpretation given in (157).
(157) Benefactive Interpretation Rule: If the purpose for an agent's action involves some sentient being or group of beings assume as default that the agent intends to please that being or group of beings by performing the action.
The multiple interpretation will arise when`for Mary' has the recipient sense. Since the purpose of John's action involves a person, namely Mary, the benefactive interpretation will arise by default. The further investigation of the relevance of pragmatic rules of this sort remains as a direction for further work.
Further applications
There are a wide range of possible further applications of the analysis proposed here. The proposal that attributes of a psoa be sorted will allow the formulation of a more elegant and structured account of semantic roles. This may be tied in with the notion of sorted relations to account for the relations between di erent types of relations and sorts of participants they have. The analysis of`for' PP adjuncts in terms of head-adj-struc should be extendable to account for other adjuncts such as`because' clauses, locatives, temporals, comitatives, and instrumentals. Another long term goal is to examine the expression of purpose in other languages in order to identify the universal aspects of the expression of purpose and what is language speci c.
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